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Abductive Moral Arguments and Godless 
Normative Realism: An Evaluation of 
Explanations for Moral Facts and 
Motivations for Moral Behavior 
Jonathan Smith 
 
Introduction 
 For the vast majority of people, religion and morality are – prima facie – 
closely related to one another. Hence, since moral arguments for the existence of 
God relate morality to religion, it is unsurprising that moral arguments are 
particularly appealing to the layman. Nevertheless, over the past few decades, there 
has been a multitude of attempts to ground morality in something other than religion 
with the hope that naturalism and certain moral intuitions might be compatible. One 
popular attempt is given by Erik Wielenberg, a philosopher at DePauw University. 
Wielenberg terms his foundation for morality Godless normative realism, wherein 
he posits that there exist necessary, basic, and brute ethical facts that ground the 
primary moral characteristics of the world. Since many moral arguments for the 
existence of God are abductive arguments moving from certain moral 
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characteristics of the world to the truth of theism, any non-theistic explanation of 
these moral characteristics weakens abductive moral arguments. Within this paper, 
I demonstrate that though Godless normative realism offers a possible explanation 
for the existence of objective moral facts and motivations for moral behavior, 
theism is a superior explanation. Consequently, though abductive moral arguments 
for theism are weakened by the possibility that Godless normative realism is the 
foundation of morality, one still has good reason to hold that theism is true given 
the existence of objective moral facts and motivations for moral behavior. 
Exposition 
The Moral Argument 
 Generally, moral arguments for the existence of God are arguments moving 
from certain moral characteristics of the world to the existence of God. There is a 
multitude of moral arguments, and many of the arguments are interrelated to one 
another. Within this paper, I am primarily concerned with whether Godless 
normative realism offers a solid foundation for the existence of both (1) objective 
moral facts and (2) sufficient motivations for individuals to be moral. Hence, the 
moral argument presented within this paper is an abductive argument proposing 
that theism is the best explanation for these two moral features of the world.1 The 
argument can be given more formally as follows: 
 
1 David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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(1) The best explanation for the existence of both objective moral facts and 
sufficient motivations for individuals to be moral is that theism is true. 
(2) There exist both objective moral facts and sufficient motivations for 
individuals to be moral. 
(3) Therefore, there is good reason to hold theism to be true. 
As stated before, this argument is abductive, and hence, both of the premises could 
be true and yet theism could be false. However, if both of the premises are true, 
then the moral characteristics of the world offer good reason – at minimum – to 
hold that theism is true. 
 Both theists and Godless normative realists affirm the second premise of the 
above argument. However, theism and Godless normative realism are competing 
explanations of the truth of the second premise. As a result, to evaluate the truth of 
the conclusion of the argument, one must evaluate the strength of either 
explanation. Moreover, if one can show that a non-theistic hypothesis is far stronger 
than the theistic hypothesis, this serves to greatly weaken the conclusion of the 
argument. There are two primary methodologies that may be taken to refute the 
first premise of the moral argument given above. First, one may attempt to 
demonstrate that theism does not offer a sufficient ground for the existence of both 
objective moral facts and motivations for moral behavior. Second, one may offer 
an alternative, and highly plausible, explanation for the existence of objective moral 
facts and motivations for moral behavior. Wielenberg, in offering support for 
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Godless normative realism, applies both methodologies. Hence, in evaluating 
whether Godless normative realism offers a better explanation for the truth of 
premise (2), we will examine both the theistic and non-theistic accounts. 
God as an Insufficient Foundation for Objective Moral Facts 
 In the Platonic dialogue, Euthyphro, Socrates asks his interlocutor, 
Euthyphro, an iconic question: “Is what is holy, holy because the Gods approve it, 
or do they approve it because it is holy?”2 The dilemma can be stated in terms more 
relevant to this paper as follows: “Is X good because God commands it, or does 
God command X because it is good?” where X is some objective moral fact. If the 
theist affirms the first disjunct, then morality seems – prima facie – to become 
arbitrary. However, if the theist affirms the second disjunct, then moral value exists 
independent of God; rather than decreeing what is good, God recognizes what is 
good. In this way, if one affirms the latter disjunct, then theism fails to offer an 
explanation for why certain moral facts obtain; the theist is in the same predicament 
as the naturalist. 
 Wielenberg’s primary argument against the sufficiency of theism as an 
explanation for objective moral facts rests on the success of the above dilemma. 
Ultimately, Wielenberg evaluates not only the affirmation of the two disjuncts, but 
also a popular method of escape through the horns of the dilemma. To understand 
 
2 Plato, “Euthyphro,” in Classics of Philosophy, ed. Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 31. 
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the third option, it is helpful to begin with two propositions related to Divine 
command theory (DCT): the control thesis and the dependency thesis. The control 
thesis states that “Every logically consistent ethical claim, E, is such that God could 
make E true.”3 The dependency thesis, on the other hand, states that “Every true 
ethical claim is true in virtue of some act of will on the part of God.”4 Now, with 
respect to these two theses, two variations of DCT may be defined: strong DCT and 
weak DCT, where strong DCT affirms the truth of both theses while weak DCT 
affirms the truth of only the dependency thesis.5 In particular, Divine nature theory, 
the view that the nature of God is the foundation for necessary and objective moral 
facts, is one variation of weak DCT. 
 Ultimately, Wielenberg rejects both strong and weak DCT. Strong DCT 
appears to have trouble responding to the problem of evil since strong DCT entails 
that God could have determined every evil that obtains in the actual world to be 
good. However, since an omnibenevolent God would desire for the created world 
to be fully good, such a consequence of strong DCT appears to negate the 
possibility of an omnibenevolent God.6 Moreover, the thought of a possible world 
in which some horrendous evil is morally praiseworthy is practically inconceivable, 
 
3 Erik Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 40. 
 
4 Ibid. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid., 44. 
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at least to the majority of ethicists. Since the control thesis entails that, in some 
possible world, a multitude of horrendous evils are morally praiseworthy, the 
control thesis contradicts firmly held moral intuitions. 
Unlike strong DCT, the problem of evil does not pose a threat for weak 
DCT, since weak DCT denies the control thesis. Moreover, weak DCT does not 
entail that there exist possible worlds in which horrendous evils are morally 
praiseworthy, and so, weak DCT coincides with our moral intuitions, at least in this 
regard. However, Wielenberg rejects weak DCT via appeals to a different moral 
intuition and the existence of intrinsically evil actions. Wielenberg states that the 
dependency thesis entails the truth of counterfactuals such as the following: “if, per 
impossible, God were not loving, He could make it the case that it is obligatory for 
someone to inflict a gratuitous pummeling on another human being.”7 However, 
this appears to contradict one’s moral intuition. Even if God is necessarily loving, 
to claim that God could vastly alter moral facts (if He were to will it), contradicts 
the tendency to believe that “there are some ethical claims that no being is powerful 
enough to make true.”8 Wielenberg also argues that the dependency thesis negates 
the possibility that objects distinct from God might be intrinsically good or evil.9 If 
any object is evil only insofar as it relates to God, then the property of being evil 
 
7 Ibid., 49. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid. 
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is conditional upon God, a being external to the object itself. However, Wielenberg 
proposes that certain objects distinct from God are intrinsically evil, and thus, the 
dependency thesis is false.  
 Lastly, Wielenberg offers a naturalistic explanation of the existence of 
objective moral facts. The explanation is rather simple: “some ethical truths are 
necessary truths,” in a similar manner to which the existence of God is a necessary 
truth for traditional theists.10 While the theist holds that God is a metaphysically 
necessary being and that moral facts necessarily obtain in light of the necessary 
existence of God, Wielenberg holds that the moral facts necessarily obtain in and 
of themselves. To justify such a proposal, Wielenberg appeals to the fact that 
traditional theists themselves posit that “the fact that God exists is a substantive, 
metaphysically necessary, brute fact.”11 Analogously, Wielenberg holds that the 
moral facts are themselves brute facts and that these brute facts obtain in every 
possible world independent of the existence or non-existence of God.12 Ultimately, 
Wielenberg posits that basic and necessary ethical truths are sufficient for the 
metaphysical grounding of objective moral facts.  
Motivations to be Moral in a Godless Universe 
 
 
10 Ibid., 51. 
11 Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless 
Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 37. 
 
12 Wielenberg, Value and Virtue, 52. 
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 Under theism, there are two primary motivations for one to be moral. The 
first motivation is the guarantee of Divine justice, the belief that moral and immoral 
activity will be rewarded or punished at some future time. If there will be 
recompense for every moral or immoral action, then it is always in one’s self-
interest to perform the moral action. The notion that, in every circumstance, one 
has sufficient reason to act morally is encapsulated in the overriding reasons thesis, 
stating that “the overriding (or strongest) reasons always favor doing what is 
morally required.”13 If the consequences of some moral action were ultimately 
detrimental to the actor, a multitude of theists would posit that it is unreasonable 
for the actor to act morally. However, on Godless normative realism, there is no 
guarantee of Divine justice, and one can imagine a multitude of scenarios in which 
a moral action entails severely detrimental consequences for the actor. Thus, the 
overriding reasons thesis is false given Godless normative realism. 
 Kant alluded to the second motivation in The Critique of Practical Reason, 
wherein Kant proposes that if theism is false, then one is not justified in believing 
that the highest good is in fact attainable.14 In other words, theism seems to entail 
that the universe is created in such a way that humanity is capable of arriving at the 
 
 
13 C. Stephen Layman, “A Moral Argument for the Existence of God,” in Is Goodness 
Without God Good Enough?, ed. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2009), 52. 
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1788). 
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end or goal of moral activity. The “ought” implies “can” principle entails that the 
moral obligation (and I would add motivation) to act morally necessitates that 
humanity is capable of attaining the highest good. If humanity is incapable of 
attaining the highest good, then humanity has neither an obligation nor sufficient 
motivation to strive after the highest good. Thus, if Godless normative realism is to 
offer sufficient motivation for individuals to act morally, this motivation must not 
depend upon the attainability of the highest good.  
 Though it is clear that any naturalistic explanation of morality is 
incompatible with these two motivations to act morally, Wielenberg offers an 
alternative motivation to act morally. For Wielenberg, the motivation to act morally 
is contained within the concept of moral obligation itself: “that a given course of 
action would satisfy one of your desires is one sort of reason for performing an 
action; that a given course of action is morally obligatory is another sort of reason 
for performing it.”15 This distinction appears to be the same distinction drawn 
between hypothetical and categorical imperatives in The Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals.16 Moreover, Wielenberg finds any motivation for ethical 
behavior grounded in self-interest to be contrary to the very nature of morality.17 
 
 
15 Wielenberg, Value and Virtue, 78. 
 
16 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. Ellington 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993). 
 
17 Wielenberg, Value and Virtue, 79. 
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For example, if I sacrifice myself for another person because it is of great benefit 
to myself, the sacrifice is not morally praiseworthy, at least not in the Kantian sense. 
Hence, the first theistic motivation for moral action is insufficient to explain truly 
moral behavior. 
 Lastly, Wielenberg offers a few examples of virtues that individuals ought 
to cultivate given the truth of Godless normative realism. For the sake of space, I 
will offer only one such virtue: humility. On theism, one ought to cultivate humility 
because he recognizes that any impressive feature he possesses was instantiated by 
God. Thus, one is not ultimately responsible for the good qualities that he possesses. 
However, Wielenberg attempts to demonstrate that humility has a similar 
justification on Godless normative realism, and in fact, naturalism in general. For 
Wielenberg, the virtue of humility is sensible on theism because one recognizes 
that he has little control over his own good fortune. Rather, God is the ultimate 
reason for his good fortune. Similarly, on Godless normative realism, one ought to 
realize that he has little control over his own good fortune, yet chance, as opposed 
to God, is the ultimate reason for his good fortune. In this way, the virtue of 
humility, on Godless normative realism, is the realization that one is subject to 
chance, and that he is not ultimately responsible for the good that comes his way. 
Response 
Intrinsic Evil and the Divine Nature 
 Within this section, I seek to offer a few thoughts related to the relationship 
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between evil objects and God (seen as a standard of morality). Wielenberg, when 
refuting weak DCT, argued that the dependency thesis negates the possibility of 
intrinsically evil actions. However, whether this refutes weak DCT is not yet 
obvious and ought to be addressed more thoroughly. Wielenberg defines intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties as follows: “the intrinsic value of a given thing is the value 
it has, if any, solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties. The extrinsic value of a given 
thing, by contrast, is the value it has in virtue of how it is related to things distinct 
from itself.”18 With this definition, it would seem that if the evil nature of an object 
is dependent upon the will of God, then this object is not intrinsically evil, but rather 
extrinsically evil. 
 There are two propositions that must be affirmed in order for Wielenberg’s 
argument to be successful: (1) If the dependency thesis is true, then there do not 
exist intrinsically evil objects, and (2) there exist intrinsically evil objects. I will 
focus here on solely proposition (2). For Wielenberg, moral obligations are the 
result of either human relationships or ethical principles that are intrinsically good. 
For example, Wielenberg might maintain that one ought to keep a promise to a 
friend because it is an implicit requirement within a friendship, while one ought not 
torture innocent children for fun because such an action is intrinsically evil. The 
first type of moral obligation focuses primarily on a contractarian understanding of 
 
18 Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 2. 
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human relationships, while the second appeals to a more categorical understanding 
of moral principles. Regardless, Wielenberg admits that relationships are often 
sufficient to demand some kind of moral behavior. 
 Now, on Godless normative realism, the absence of intrinsically evil actions 
could be problematic, since, if the only source of moral obligation is human 
relationships, then, when one is not constrained by a human relationship, he has no 
moral obligations. For example, consider an individual who, when he is by himself, 
is self-absorbed, and yet, when interacting with others, is self-sacrificing. On 
Godless normative realism, this individual has no obligation to change his behavior, 
though intuitively, we affirm that he ought not be self-absorbed even when his self-
absorption is unrelated to his human relationships. Thus, for Godless normative 
realism to align with moral intuitions, there must exist some other source of moral 
obligation, such as the intrinsic value of a character trait. If one posits that it is 
intrinsically wrong to be self-absorbed and further posits that this is a sufficient 
condition for the moral obligation not to be self-absorbed, then the self-absorbed 
individual ought not be self-absorbed, even when he is alone. 
 However, with respect to traditional theism, there do not exist actions 
independent of the relationship between God and man. Hence, if theism is true, then 
one ought not be self-absorbed even when he is alone since he is obligated, in the 
relational sense, not to be self-absorbed. Consequently, on theism, if no actions are 
intrinsically evil, this does not alter one’s moral obligations. Hence, why should the 
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theist not claim that all moral and immoral actions possess only extrinsic value and 
maintain that one is obligated to act morally due to the relationship between man 
and his Creator? Would such a position be detrimental to the theistic explanation 
of morality? Such a theory appears to be extensionally equivalent to a theistic 
explanation incorporating intrinsically good actions. Moreover, the affirmation of 
intrinsically evil or intrinsically good actions appears to be quite Kantian, and as 
such, might not gain support from a multitude of ethicists, since metaethical 
theories such as egoism and utilitarianism already deny the intrinsic good of ethical 
actions. As a result of these considerations, Wielenberg’s insistence that certain 
moral facts must possess intrinsic value, as he defines intrinsic value, appears 
unjustified. 
Equivocating the Term ‘Ought” 
It is common for the naturalist to claim that naturalism offers a solid 
foundation for morality because belief in God is not necessary for moral behavior. 
However, it ought to be noted that such a statement, though true, does not refute 
the first premise of the moral argument given within this paper. This paper is not 
concerned with whether one is capable of being moral while naturalism obtains, 
but rather whether it is reasonable for one to be moral while naturalism obtains. It 
is simple to argue that “a person can be moral without belief in God,” but much 
more difficult to give rational justification for the performance of particular moral 
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actions.19 However, even demonstrating that it is reasonable for an individual to 
perform a moral action X, given naturalism, is not equivalent to the claim that an 
individual ought to perform X given naturalism. 
In evaluating whether Wielenberg’s theory offers a robust explanation of 
moral facts, one should recognize a couple of subtle distinctions between different 
uses of the term ‘ought’. There are two uses of the word ‘ought’ with which I am 
interested. The first use is related to an expected consequence of previously 
obtaining states of affairs. For example, we often say things such as “The air-
conditioner has been turned off for a few weeks, so the electric bill ought to be 
fairly cheap this month.” Ought, when used in this sense, is not an inherently moral 
term, but rather a term referring to rational consequences of a group of facts. The 
other meaning of the term ‘ought’ is related to the deviation from a standard. For 
example, the phrase “He ought not to have stolen from her” is not concerned with 
whether stealing follows rationally from previously known facts, but rather with 
whether stealing corresponds to a standard of human conduct. 
Ultimately, the first use of the term ‘ought’ is insufficient for moral 
obligation, though it might be sufficient for a rational obligation. When discussing 
the foundation of virtue on Godless normative realism, Wielenberg demonstrates 
that an individual ought to cultivate humility as a rational response to facts 
 
19 Paul Kurtz, “The Kurtz/Craig Debate: Is Goodness without God Good Enough?,” in Is 
Goodness Without God Good Enough?, trans. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Maryland, 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 25. 
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obtaining in the world, namely, that one has little control over his own good fortune, 
and chance is ultimately responsible for one’s good fortune. However, 
demonstrating that one ought to be humble where ‘ought’ is used in the first sense 
does not imply that one has a moral obligation to be humble. Hence, Wielenberg’s 
argumentation, as it stands, fails to explain why one is morally obligated to be 
humble, though it is successful in demonstrating the rationality of humility given 
naturalism. 
DCT and Arbitrary Moral Principles 
 Since the majority of Wielenberg’s argumentation in opposition to the 
theistic account of morality is dependent on the Euthyphro Dilemma, defending a 
theistic response to the Euthyphro Dilemma serves to remove much of the support 
for Godless normative realism. There are three primary responses to the Euthyphro 
dilemma: (1) strong DCT, (2) weak DCT, and (3) the autonomy thesis, where the 
autonomy thesis is the proposition that necessary and objective moral facts exist 
ontologically independent of God. Both Wielenberg’s argument from the problem 
of evil and his argument from the fact that moral facts become arbitrary as a result 
of the control thesis supply good reason to reject strong DCT. Moreover, because 
the autonomy thesis affirms that objective moral facts exist independently of God, 
the foundation for these facts is independent of God. Therefore, if the autonomy 
thesis is true, premise (1) of the moral argument within this paper is probably false. 
Consequently, weak DCT seems to be the response to the Euthyphro dilemma with 
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the most optimistic outlook. 
 The first argument in refutation of weak DCT, the argument from the 
existence of intrinsically good and intrinsically evil moral actions, was discussed 
previously. The second argument against weak DCT, the argument from the 
intuition that no being could possess the power to alter moral facts, will be 
addressed here. If this second objection can be overcome, weak DCT is still a 
tenable response to the Euthyphro dilemma. To begin, if some fact necessarily 
obtains, this does not entail that this fact is ontologically independent of other 
necessary facts. For example, consider the fact “2+2=4.” This fact is dependent on 
the Peano axioms of arithmetic, meaning that “2+2=4” obtains because the Peano 
axioms obtain. However, the fact “2+2=4” still obtains necessarily. In the same 
way, we can maintain that moral facts obtain necessarily, and yet, are dependent 
upon the existence of God: “If necessary truths can stand to one another in 
asymmetric relations of explanatory priority, then there is no objection so far to 
holding that moral values exist because God exists.”20 
 Now, the objector to weak DCT might argue as follows. Assume that the 
dependency thesis is true. Then, for some evil action x, if God were to will that x is 
good, then x would be good. The difficulty with such an argument is that “the 
counterfactual in question has an impossible antecedent, and so, on the customary 
 
20 William Lane Craig, “The Most Gruesome of Guests,” in Is Goodness Without God 
Good Enough?, trans. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2009), 170. 
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semantics, has no nonvacuous truth value.”21 In other words, there does not exist a 
possible world in which God wills that x is good, and moreover, neither does there 
exist a possible world in which x is morally good. Both the nature of God and the 
fact that x is an evil action obtain in all possible worlds. Hence, it is difficult to 
ascertain the meaning of such a counterfactual. Consequently, I am unconvinced 
that the dependency thesis leads to conflicts with strongly held moral intuitions or 
moral presuppositions. It seems sufficient to know that moral facts obtain 
necessarily, regardless of whether these facts are explanatorily dependent upon the 
existence of God. Finally, if the dependency thesis is unscathed by Wielenberg’s 
objections, then weak DCT is at least one plausible theistic explanation for the 
existence of objective moral facts.  
The Autonomy Thesis and the Need for God 
 Lastly, let us assume that the Autonomy Thesis is in fact correct. Are there 
still moral characteristics of the world that are unexplained by Godless normative 
realism? So far within this paper, we have focused particularly upon the explanatory 
power of theism and Godless normative realism as they relate to the existence of 
objective moral facts and motivations for moral behaviors. However, even if theism 
is an insufficient foundation for these two aspects of morality, theism seems to offer 
a few explanations for separate aspects of morality. Particularly, theism offers an 
 
 
21 Ibid., 172. 
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explanation for the possibility of moral knowledge, and theism offers an 
explanation for why necessary and objective moral facts pertain to humanity. 
 First, if theism is true, then one would expect that God created humans with 
the capability of possessing moral knowledge since a good God would desire his 
creatures to know and uphold the standard for moral living. However, if naturalism 
is true, there is little to no reason to expect that the beliefs we possess about morality 
correspond to objective moral facts. Rather, our moral beliefs are likely to 
correspond to those beliefs that are most evolutionarily beneficial, and the beliefs 
that are most evolutionarily beneficial need not be the same as the beliefs 
corresponding to objective moral facts. Since humans do in fact possess moral 
knowledge, these considerations offer good support for the truth of theism. 
 Second, theism offers an explanation of the fact that objective moral facts 
pertain to humanity and alter human behavior since an intelligent creator of the 
universe is capable of intentionally organizing creation in such a way as to 
incorporate necessary moral facts into daily human life. If naturalism is true, we do 
not have an explanation for why humans are moral beings, beings concerned with 
objective moral facts. For example, humans appear to be the only beings on earth 
capable of ascertaining moral facts. This means that somewhere within the 
evolutionary process, humans must have become cognizant of objective moral 
facts, yet offering an explanation for this phenomenon on naturalism is difficult, if 
not, impossible. 
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 These additional moral features of the world, though not contained within 
the moral argument with which we are primarily concerned, again support the 
notion that the explanatory scope of theism is greater than that of Godless normative 
realism. Therefore, though Godless normative realism may offer a partial 
explanation for the moral characteristics of the world, theism ultimately appears to 
be a superior explanation.  
Conclusion 
 Within this paper, it has been demonstrated that Godless normative realism 
is one possible explanation for the existence of objective moral facts and 
motivations for moral behavior. However, the explanation for these two moral 
aspects of the world given by Godless normative realism appears to be less 
powerful, though plausible, than the theistic explanation. Also, the theistic 
explanation of morality appears to span a broad range of moral characteristics of 
the world, while the scope of Godless normative realism is more modest. Therefore, 
though Godless normative realism diminishes the strength of the abductive moral 
argument given at the beginning of this paper, it does so minimally, and 
consequently, the existence of objective moral facts and motivations for moral 
behavior still offer good reasons to hold that theism is true.
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